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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:
CaseNo.20060099-CA

v.

:

DARRELL DEAN ANDERSON
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a sentence imposed for convictions, entered by the Court, of
simple assault, a Class A Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 , and
violation of a protective order, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-108 , in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, the Honorable
Roger S. Dutson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(d), (i) & (j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

MAY A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT INVOLVING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, NOT A RESULT OF A PLEA AGREEMENT REDUCING ANOTHER CHARGE, BE
USED TO ENHANCE A SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMES?

This issue was preserved by the trial court's order denying enhancement of the
subsequent charges. R395-98 (Addendum B). As noted in State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f
14, 127 P.3d 682, "[TJhe proper interpretation of a statue is a question of law that should
be reviewed for correctness."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant, by information, with retaliation against a witness or
informant and violation of a protective order (Case No. 031904848) and two counts of
violation of a protective order and two counts of assault (Case No. 031904234). For
purposes of trial, the cases were combined under Case No. 031904234. The assault and
violation of protective order charges were enhanced to third degree felonies from Class A
Misdemeanors, based on a plea in abeyance by the defendant to a domestic violence
disorderly conduct charge on October 3, 2002. A conviction was subsequently entered
against the defendant on that charge for disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor.
(R4-7, 65-68,278-79, 356, 360.).
On November 2, 2005, the defendant was convicted of two enhanced felony
convictions; violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, simple assault, and Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-108, violation of a protective order.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

MAY A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT INVOLVING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, NOT A RESULT OF A PLEA AGREEMENT REDUCING ANOTHER CHARGE, BE
USED TO ENHANCE A SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMES?

This issue was preserved by the trial court's order denying enhancement of the
subsequent charges. R395-98 (Addendum B). As noted in State v Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f
14,127 P.3d 682, "[T]he proper interpretation of a statue is a question of law that should
be reviewed for correctness."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant, by information, with retaliation against a witness or
informant and violation of a protective order (Case No. 031904848) and two counts of
violation of a protective order and two counts of assault (Case No. 031904234). For
purposes of trial, the cases were combined under Case No. 031904234. The assault and
violation of protective order charges were enhanced to third degree felonies from Class A
Misdemeanors, based on a plea in abeyance by the defendant to a domestic violence
disorderly conduct charge on October 3, 2002. A conviction was subsequently entered
against the defendant on that charge for disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor.
(R4-7, 65-68,278-79, 356, 360.).
On November 2, 2005, the defendant was convicted of two enhanced felony
convictions; violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, simple assault, and Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-108, violation of a protective order.
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Prior to trial the defendant, on two occasions, challenged the efficacy of
enhancing the charges based on the disorderly conduct charge, which only involved his
father-in-law. On October 22, 2003, a motion was filed to quash the enhancement of the
charges in Case # 031904234, arguing that the previous conviction for disorderly conduct
did not qualify as a domestic violence offence. (TT-65). The Court initially granted that
motion but subsequently reversed the ruling to allow the enhancement of the charges
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1 . (R51-52, 61-71). Prior to the commencement
of the jury trial on October 27, 2005, the defendant again renewed his motion to quash
the enhancement of the charges based upon the disorderly conduct conviction which was
also denied by the Court. (R-274-79; TT1 \l} ) The defendant conditionally stipulated
the prior conviction could be deemed one for "domestic violence disorderly conduct" to
preserve the challenge of the legal issues presented. (TT1:21; TT2:221).
Prior to sentencing on November 30th- 2005, defendant filed a Motion pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 to reduce the November 2 convictions to Class A
Misdemeanors. (R346-49). The Court ordered the parties to brief the following issues:
(1) whether the October 3, 2002 disorderly conduct conviction qualified as an enhancing
domestic violence conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-l(2)(o), and (2) whether the
disorderly conduct conviction qualified as a domestic violence conviction under the
language used by the Judge who revoked the Plea in Abeyance. (R351 -53). The hearing
to resolve these issues was held January 6, 2006. (R3 69-70). At the conclusion of that
hearing Judge Dutson ruled: 1) that the disorderly conduct offense was one involving
domestic violence (R5-6, 24-26, 29-30), and that it could not be used for enhancement

1

With the exception of the transcript of the preliminary hearing, none of the transcripts of the proceedings
have been paginated. Trial transcripts are indicated by "TT[volume number]."

purposes because it had not been reduced to disorderly conduct from one the offences
enumerated in U.C.A. § 77-36-1.1. See January 6, 2006 Evidentiary Hearing ("EH") at
28, 29, 2920 - 30; R395-98 (Order Denying Enhancement of Charges, "Order")
(Addendum B). Accordingly, the Trial Court reduced both convictions to Class A
Misdemeanors. (R398; 400-01; EH:29).
Defendant was sentenced on January 23, 2006 to two consecutive terms of 365
days, with credit for time served. (R-401). The State filed its Notice of Appeal the same
day. (R402). Defendant requested an extension to file a Cross Appeal on February 22,
2006 - which the Trial Court granted - and he filed his Notice of Appeal on March 14,
2006. (R517-23).
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
On August 3, 2003, Leslie Anderson, who was three months pregnant, was
driving her husband (Defendant) and their one-year-old daughter Jayden to a family party
in South Ogden. (TT:66). While in the car, she and the defendant continued an argument
that had begun earlier and had been "ongoing . . . all day." (TT1:67). He became angry,
began yelling, refused to exit the car when Leslie asked him to do so, shoved her against
the driver's door several times, and grabbed the steering wheel, causing the car to swerve
toward oncoming traffic. (TT1:69). Rather than continue to the party, Leslie drove
home. (TTl:69-70,73,88).
When they arrived home the abuse continued and became physical when the
defendant shoved Leslie, who was holding Jayden on her hip, into the living room wall
five or six times. (TT1:79-81). Eventually she was able to barricade herself and her

2

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 2, 12 P.3d 92.
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daughter in the upstairs bedroom. (TT1:87-88). Although she obtained a prescription
for back pain, she testified that she didn't think of the episode as domestic violence
because she wasn't "half dead in a hospital, black and blue, bloody" and did not report
the incident to the police at that time. (TT1:84, 86).
The next day, Leslie obtained an ex parte Protective Order, applicable against
defendant at their home and the home of her parents, and her place of employment.
(TT1:94-96; TT2:151, 373-74). Later that day the defendant was served with the order
while he was at the family home retrieving personal items and some food. (TT2:262-63,
PH.-30-31).
In violation of the protective order, on August 14, 2004, during Leslie's absence,
the defendant went to the home early in the afternoon to retrieve his mail from the
curbside mail box. This action by the defendant was observed by a neighbor and was the
basis for the conviction under count 4.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court correctly reduced the enhanced charges because the predicate
necessary for the enhancement did not occur. The plea in abeyance entered into by the
defendant October, 2003 was not to a charge, as mandated by U. C. A. § 77-36-1.2 (O).

ARGUMENT

THE PAIN, BROAD LANGUAGE OF §§ 77-36-1 AND 77-36-1.1 SUPPORT THE
PROPOSITION THAT A FINDING OF A PRIOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
OFFENSE REQUIRES ENHANCEMENT, WITHOUT REGARD TO WHETHER
THE OFFENSE IS REDUCED FROM A GREATER CHARGE OR IS
SPECIFICALLY ENUMERATED IN THE STATUTES

Defendant was convicted of Misdemeanor domestic violence offenses. Utah law
directs that those convictions may be enhanced because defendant had previously been
convicted of disorderly conduct, a qualifying domestic violence offense under facts
found by the Trial Court. However, because the Trial Court improperly read a
requirement into the statute, it illegally failed to enhance defendant's sentences as the
prosecution requested.
A conviction for domestic violence offense may be enhanced one degree of the
offender is convicted of a Misdemeanor domestic violence offense within five years of
the prior conviction. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1 3, Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1(2)
generally defines domestic violence as "any criminal offense involving violence or
physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm . . . when committed by one
cohabitant against another." Section 77-36-1 (2)(o) adds that it is "also" domestic
violence "if a conviction of disorderly conduct is the result of a plea agreement in which
the defendant was originally charged with any of the domestic violence offenses
described in this Subsection (2);" that is, in addition to the general definition, the statute
"also" includes a number of enumerated offenses from simple assault and violation of a
protective order to plain language of subsection (2)(o) required that a disorderly conduct
conviction had to be reduced from a greater offense in order to apply for enhancement

3

The 2004 version of section 77-36-1.1, provided:
(1) When an offender is convicted of any domestic violence offense in Utah, or is convicted in
any other state, or in any district, possession, or territory of the United States, of an offense
that would be a domestic violence offense under Utah law, and is within a five-year period
after the conviction subsequently charged with a domestic violence offense that is a
misdemeanor, the offense charged and the punishement for that subsequent offense may be
enhanced by one degree above the offense and punishment otherwise provided in the statutes
described in Section 77-36-1.
(2) For purposes of this section, a Plea in Abeyance is considered a conviction.
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purposes. See R397-98 (Order Denying Enhancement of Charges) (Addendum B). The
Trial Court was correct in its ruling. The Defendant was not originally charged with
another crime nor with one otherwise enumerated as a domestic violence in the statute.
He was charged with a crime not listed in the §77-36-1(2), to wit, domestic violence
disorderly conduct. His plea in abeyance was not to a reduced charge as otherwise listed
in the statute.
The State correctly noted that "The proper interpretation and application of a
statue is a question of law which we review for correctness, affording no deference to the
district court's legal conclusion." State ex rel IK, 2006 UT App 205, If 5, 138 P.3d 70;
Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App 107 P.3d 693 % 4. Also when interpreting a statute, the
reviewing court seeks to "evidence the true intent and purpose of the legislature," which,
absent ambiguity, is best derived from the statute's plain meaning. State v. Maestas,
2002 UT 23, f 52, 63 P.3d 621 And, as noted in Keene, f 10, "Only when we find
ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy considerations."
The language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-l(2)(o) is clear and unambiguous. The
Trial Court correctly observed that "the statute clarly states that the 'disorderly conduct'
offens must be 'the result of a plea agreement in which the Defendant was originally
charged with. . .' any of the enumerated offenses within the statute." R397 (emphasis in
Order)

n

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion and the statutory language allowing the
discretionary enhancement of the prior offense, the Defendant respectfully requests that
the Court's ruling reducing Count One and Count Two to misdemeanors, be affirmed.

CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a sentence imposed for convictions, entered by the Court,
of simple assault, a Class A Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 ,
and violation of a protective order, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-108 , in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, the
Honorable Roger S. Dutson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(d), (i) & (j) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d).

ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

The Court incorrectly determined that the Defendant had a prior
conviction for domestic violence disorderly conduct.

2.

Subdivision C of the Utah Cohabitant Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §30-6l(2)(a)(c) is ambiguous, overbroad, and vague. "The proper interpretation
of a statute is a question of law that should be reviewed for correctness."
State v. Barrett, 2005 UT App. 88, \ 14, 127 P.3d 682. Generally, the
Appellate Court will review "a trial court's legal conclusions for
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no particular deference." The issue was preserved by the trial court's finding that
Subdivision C was applicable to the Defendant.

STATEMENT OF CASE
On August 22,2002, the Defendant was at his father-in-law's residence in Roy,
when an altercation arose between the Defendant and his father-in-law. The
confrontation ended quickly when other family members intervened. The police were
not involved.
When the Defendant returned home later that afternoon, he called the Roy City
Police Department for the purpose of reporting his father-in-law for assault. After an
investigation, Roy City Police Department cited the Defendant for "D.V. and disorderly
conduct", Utah Code Ann. §76-9-102 (PH Exhibit "A"). In Utah v. Richards, UT App.
779 P.2d 689 (1989), the court held, under similar circumstances, "Evidence would not
support disorderly conduct conviction; behavior complained of took place in confines of
defendant's home, and witnesses testified that conversation was never loud enough to be
heard outside and could not be classified as unreasonable noise, although witnesses could
hear voices and there appeared to be confrontation going on in home."
On September 19, 2002, the Defendant appeared in the Roy Court and was
arraigned for disorderly conduct, Class C Misdemeanor. The Defendant again appeared
in the Roy Court on October 3, 2002. The judge at that hearing, the Honorable Stanton
M. Taylor, accepted the Defendant's plea in abeyance to disorderly conduct, a Class C
Misdemeanor (PH Exhibit "A", minute entry). At the time of the Defendant's original
appearance in Roy, the minute entries and transcript of that hearing reflects that the

appearance in Roy, the minute entries and transcript of that hearing reflects that the
Defendant was not represented by counsel, and there was no discussion by the Court with
regard to the D.V. meaning to the charge. An audio tape recording of the plea does
indicate, however, that he was willing to enter a no contest plea to domestic violence
disorderly conduct. Significantly, however, when the Court took the plea, he only
described disorderly conduct, with no explanation of the domestic violence aspect of the
charge.
On November 20, 2003 Judge Parley Baldwin presided at the hearing concerning
the Defendant's violation of this plea agreement. Judge Baldwin found that the Roy
Court proceedings clearly did not reflect to what charge the Defendant had pleaded.
Judge Baldwin revoked the plea in abeyance and entered a conviction for disorderly
conduct without the domestic violence characterization. (R-352).
It is clear from Judge Dutson's order to submit written briefs that he also had
questions regarding the initial conviction of the Defendant. (R-351). Specifically, the
Court directed this issue be briefed as follows:
"(2) Does the entry of the Disorderly Conduct conviction by Judge Baldwin on
November 20,2003 qualify as a domestic violence conviction under the language used
by Judge Baldwin when entering the conviction? It does not appear that Judge Baldwin
stated unequivocally that it was being entered as a Domestic Violence conviction and the
Court is asking the parties to brief the issue of whether or not that is needed or if it is
sufficient that the underlying facts show that it was a domestic violence offense."
Without further facts or supporting record, at the evidentiary hearing on January 6, 2006,
the Court entered its findings. The charge was a prior domestic violence offense.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The ruling by the trial court that Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct is
clearly erroneous, and is not supported by the record or the facts. As noted in
Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App, 107 P.3d 693 % 11 : "A judge's findings of fact
must be articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis of the ultimate
conclusion can be understood." Clearly the record reflects that the Court did not
articulate the underlying facts to show that the Defendant had committed a
domestic violence offense.

2.

In the Utah Cohabitant Abuse Act, the legislature has attempted to provide a
specific definition of what a cohabitant is, for the purposes of the Act. The Act
defines a "cohabitant" as a person "C) related by blood or marriage to the other
party." No appellate court in Utah has addressed the issue of how to define
cohabitant in the context of Subdivision C.
The Defendant filed a motion to quash the informations enhancing the
charges against him in Case No. 031904234 (PH 1-10), challenging the
application of the statute to the circumstance involving the Defendant and his
father-in-law. The Court, however, ruled that the Defendant, under that
definition, was a cohabitant, for purposes of this act.
A basic tenet of statutory construction provides that a statute will be found
unconstitutionally vague when it is not sufficiently explicit and clear to inform
the ordinary person of common intelligence as to what conduct is proscribed.
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (1987). The same construction should be
applied to the language of Utah Code Annotated §30-6-1 (Subdivision C). The

language of this provision is overbroad and vague, because it fails to define or
identify those persons included or identified as related "by blood or marriage" to
the other party. It could readily include persons that the accused does not knowthe accused may not even be aware of the "blood or marriage" relationship to the
person they are "cohabitating" with, or have "cohabitated" with.
The legislative enactment of Subdivision C was predicated on the legislative
intent of preventing abuse and violence against women and children as well as
residents of the same household. The other provisions of this definition comport
with this legislative intent. Subdivision C is an anomoly which this Court should
find overbroad and vague by its language4. In light of the purpose behind the
Cohabitant Abuse Act, the definition of Subdivision C should be found an
anomoly which does not provide adequate notice regarding those persons the
Legislature intended to restrict by criminally identified conduct.
As noted from the facts of this case, the altercation was only brought to the
attention of the Roy City Police by the Defendant some time after its occurrence.
The citation is an example of the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement which
this provision allows. [State v. McGuire, 84 P.3d 1171 (Utah 2004)]

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Appellee/Cross-Appellant respectfully
requests this Court to find Subdivision C vague and overbroad.

Keene, ibid.

RESPECTFULLY SUMBITTED this ( 3

day of October, 2006

^7y?yQ^Z^^
MERLIN G. CALVER
Attorney for the Appellee
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Assistant Utah Attorney General
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84414-0854
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Legal Assistant
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ADDENDUM "A"

Utah Code Section 30-6-1

rage ± ^ *.

30-6-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abuse" means intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to
cause a cohabitant physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing a
cohabitant in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm.
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to Section 15-2-1
or a person who is 16 years of age or older who:
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party;
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party;
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other party;
(d) has one or more children in common with the other party;
(e) is the biological parent of the other party's unborn child; or
(f) resides or has resided in the same residence as the other party.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does not include:
(a) the relationship of natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent to a
minor; or
(b) the relationship between natural, adoptive, step, or foster siblings who
are under 18 years of age.
(4) "Court clerk" means a district court clerk.
(5) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is defined in Section
77-36-1.
(6) "Ex parte protective order" means an order issued without notice to the
defendant in accordance with this chapter.
(7) "Foreign protective order" means a protective order issued by another
state, territory, or possession of the United States, tribal lands of the United
States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia which
shall be given full faith and credit in Utah, if the protective order is similar to
a protective order issued in compliance with Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant
Abuse Act, or Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, and
includes the following requirements:
(a) the requirements of due process were met by the issuing court,
including subject matter and personal jurisdiction;
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice; and
(c) the respondent had an opportunity for a hearing regarding the protective
order.
(8) "Law enforcement unit" or "law enforcement agency" means any public
agency having general police power and charged with making arrests in
connection with enforcement of the criminal statutes and ordinances of this
10/24/2005

§ 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 . Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily
injury to another.
Laws 1974, c. 32, § 38; Laws 1989, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 75, § 3; Laws 1995, c.
291, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 140, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2000, c.
170, § 2, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2003, c. 109, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003.

§ 76-9-102, Disorderly conduct
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to movefrom&
public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, tff
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavidf
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place;
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard in
a public place; or
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to WhJpqi
the public or a substantial group of the public has access and'includes ^ I f
not limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of scHools, hospitals,,
apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues aftef
a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction.

§ 7 7 - 3 6 - 1 . Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as in Section 30-6-1.
(2) "Domestic violence" means any criminal offense involving violence or
physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit a criminal offense involving violence or physical
harm, when committed by one cohabitant against another, "Domestic violence"
also means commission or attempt to commit, any of the following offenses by
one cohabitant against another:
(a) aggravated assault, as described in Section 76-5-103;
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102;
(c) criminal homicide, as described in Section 76-5-201;
(d) harassment, as described in Section 76-5-106;
(e) telephone harassment, as described in Section 76-9-201;
(f) kidnaping, child kidnaping, or aggravated kidnaping, as described in
Sections 76-5-301, 76-5-301.1, and 76-5-302;
Cg) mayhem, as described in Section 76-5-105;
(h) sexual offenses, as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Title 76,
Chapter 5a;
(i) stalking, as described in Section 76-5-106.5;
(j) unlawful detention, as described in Section 76-5-304;
(k) violation of a protective order or ex parte protective order, as described
in Section 76-5-108;
(/) any offense against property described in Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, 2t
or 3;
(m) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, as described in
Section 76-10-507;
(n) discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or tm the
direction of any person, building, or vehicle, as described in Section
76-10-508;
(o) disorderly conduct, as defined in Section 76-9-102, if a conviction of
disorderly conduct is the result of a plea agreement in which the defendant
was originally charged with any of the domestic violence offenses otherwise
described in this Subsection (2). Conviction of disorderly conduct as a
domestic violence offense, in the manner described in this Subsection (2)(o),
does not constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18
U.S.C. Section 921, and is exempt from the provisions of the federal Firearms
Act, 18 U.S C. Section 921 et seq.; or
(p) child abuse as described in Section 76-5-109.1.
(3) "Victim" means a cohabitant who has been subjected to domestic violence.

ADDENDUM "B"

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH <f
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
.^
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STATE OF UTAH,

- / •>

ORDER DENYING
ENHANCEMENT OF CHARGES

Plaintiff,

^

vs.
Case No. 031904234 FS
Honorable Roger S. Dutson

DARRELL DEAN ANDERSON,
Defendant.

FACTS
Defendant Anderson was tried and convicted byjury oftwo Third Degree Felonies, Domestic
Violence Assault and Violation of a Protective Order. Defendant filed appropriate Motions to have
the cases tried as Class A Misdemeanors and argued that the State should not be allowed to use a
Disorderly Conduct conviction to enhance the Class A Misdemeanors one level to Third Degree
Felonies.
The Defendant pled no contest to a charge of Domestic Violence Disorderly Conduct which
plea was initially held in abeyance by Judge Taylor on October 3, 2002 and later entered as a
conviction on November 20,2003 by Judge Baldwin. There had been no other Domestic Violence
convictions or charges filed against the Defendant and the Disorderly Conduct was not a reduction
from any other charge. After afallreview of the transcripts of pleadings the record shows that there
was a dispute between the defendant and his father-in-law (the present victim's father) that gave rise
to this earlier charge. Based on all the facts of that case, this Court has concluded that it was clearly
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a conviction for Disorderly Conduct involving Domestic Violence. It has always been Defendant's
contention that the Court should not treat that Disorderly Conduct as involving Domestic Violence
as that term is defined by statute. However, Defendant's did not raise the question of whether or not,
if it was a Disorderly Conduct - Domestic Violence conviction, that it still should not be considered
an enhancing offense under UCA §77-36-1 (2) and UCA §77-36-1.1 (3).
Prior to sentencing, this Court directed the parties to brief the enhancement statute as it
relates to this case.
UCA §77-36-1 (2) defines 'Domestic Violence' as follows:
Any criminal offense involving violence or physical harm or threat of violence or
physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit criminal offense
involving violence or physical harm, when committed by one cohabitant against
another. uDomestic violence " also means commission or attempt to commit, any of
the following offenses by one cohabitant against another:
[The statute then lists offenses from (a) through (p) including the following]
(o) disorderly conduct as defined in Section §76-9-102, if a conviction of disorderly
conduct is the result of a plea agreement in which the defendant was originally
charges with any of the domestic violence offenses otherwise described in this
Subsection (21 (emphasis added) [That section then establishes an exception
regarding federal firearms law]
This offense was not originally charged originally under Subsection (2).
The enhancement provisions of the law are found in UCA §77-36-1.1 which increases the
offense one level higher if there has been a prior Domestic Violence conviction within five years.
It describes a 'conviction' as including a 'plea in abeyance' as occurred herein.
DISCUSSION OF ENHANCEMENT STATUTE
The State veiy logically argues that the wording of the statute makes no common sense in
requiring a 'disorderly conduct' domestic violence conviction to be reduced from one of the other
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qualifying offenses where, as in this case, (1) The facts of the disorderly conduct offense are clearly
included in the 'domestic violence' definitions, and (2) The case was not originally charged at a
higher level and reduced down to or finally disposed of as a Disorderly Conduct-Domestic Violence.
However, the intent of the legislature seems clear that is the requirement. Ifpossible, the Court must
construe the plain language of the statute. The sole issue is whether the disorderly conduct conviction
or plea in abeyance comes within the enhancing language of the statute. The statute clearly states that
the * disorderly conduct' offense must be "... the result ofa plea agreement in which the defendant
was originally charged with . . . " any of the enumerated offenses within the statute. That did not
occur in this case.
Among those higher enumerated offenses are Class B Misdemeanor 'assault', 'harassment',
and 'telephone harassment' and ironically, those enumerated offenses includes an 'attempt' to
commit those offenses, several of which, if charged as an 'attempt' to commit those offenses, would
also be a Class C Misdemeanor, the same level offense as disorderly conduct-domestic violence.
The same result occurs by charging originally as a Class C Misdemeanor Disorderly ConductDomestic Violence. But, under the statute as presently adopted, even though a Disorderly ConductDomestic Violence offense occurs, the clear language of subsection (o), prevents this Court from
considering it as an enhancing offense. This is because the legislature has quite illogically
determined that disorderly conduct must be reduced downfroma higher charged offense to qualify.
It is certainly not consistent with what would seem to be the purpose of the enhancement statute, but
that is how it is presently drafted.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court must conclude that under the enhancement statute, a Disorderly Conduct Order
State vs, Anderson
Case No. 031904234 FS

%

Domestic Violence conviction that has not originally been charged as one of the enumerated offenses
and then reduced to disorderly conduct, does not qualify to enhance the two Class A Misdemeanors
to Third Degree Felonies. Therefore, those convictions should be entered as convictions of Class A
Misdemeanors rather than felonies. The jury was given a stipulation that the Court had ruled on
earlier that the charges could be enhanced if they found a Protective Order violation or Assault on
a pregnant woman, and therefore thefindingof guilty of two third degree felonies must be entered
as convictions of two Class A Misdemeanors.
The jury was hung on other charges and at the hearing held before this Court on January 6,
2005, the County Prosecutor moved that this Court dismiss the additional charges and vacate the trial
date which had been set.
ORDER
The Third Degree Felony Protective Order Violation is hereby entered as' a Class A
Misdemeanor conviction and the Third Degree Felony Assault of a pregnant woman is hereby
entered as a Class A Misdemeanor conviction.
The additional charges for which the Defendant could have been retried are hereby dismissed
upon motion of the County Prosecutor.
rosecutor.
DATED this

«-
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ROGER S.DOTSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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